Abstract. Pseudorandom function tribe ensembles are pseudorandom function ensembles that have an additional collision resistance property: almost all functions have disjoint ranges. We present an alternative to the construction of pseudorandom function tribe ensembles based on oneway permutations given by Canetti, Micciancio and Reingold CMR98]. Our approach yields two di erent but related solutions: One construction is somewhat theoretic, but conceptually simple and therefore gives an easier proof that one-way permutations su ce to construct pseudorandom function tribe ensembles. The other, slightly more complicated solution provides a practical construction; it starts with an arbitrary pseudorandom function ensemble and assimilates the one-way permutation to this ensemble. Therefore, the second solution inherits important characteristics of the underlying pseudorandom function ensemble: it is almost as e cient and if the starting pseudorandom function ensemble is e ciently invertible (given the secret key) then so is the derived tribe ensemble. We also show that the latter solution yields so-called committing private-key encryption schemes. i.e., where each ciphertext corresponds to exactly one plaintext | independently of the choice of the secret key or the random bits used in the encryption process.
Introduction
In CMR98] Canetti, Micciancio and Reingold introduce the concept of pseudorandom function tribe ensembles. Informally, such tribe ensembles consist of pseudorandom functions that have an independent public key in addition to the secret key. Though this public key, called the tribe key, is independent of the secret key, it guarantees that any image/preimage pair commits to the secret key. More speci cally, for a random tribe key t there do not exist secret keys k 6 = k 0 and a value x such that the functions determined by the keys k; t resp. k 0 ; t map x to the same value (except with exponentially small probability, where the probability is taken over the choice of t). Canetti et al. CMR98] use such pseudorandom function tribe ensembles to construct perfectly one-way probabilistic hash functions. In contrast to ordinary one-way functions, such perfectly one-way probabilistic hash functions hide all partial information about the preimage (secrecy), yet nding a hash value together with distinct preimages is infeasible (collision resistance). In C97] Canetti presents perfectly oneway hash functions based on a speci c number-theoretic assumption, namely the Decisional-Di e-Hellman assumption. Generalizing this result, Canetti, Micciancio and Reingold CMR98] show that perfectly one-way functions can be constructed from any cryptographic hash function (achieving secrecy statistically and collision resistance computationally) or from any pseudorandom function tribe ensembles (with computational secrecy and statistical collision resistance). In the latter case, the pseudorandomness of the tribe ensemble provides secrecy and collision resistance follows from the property of the tribe key. Canetti et al. CMR98 ] also prove that PRF tribe ensembles exist if one-way permutations exist. Their construction is a modi cation of the GGM-tree design of PRF ensembles GGM86] combined with a generalization of the Goldreich-Levin hardcore predicate GL89]. A sketch of this construction is given in Appendix A. Here, we take a di erent approach which consists of two elementary and independent steps. First, we show that any one-way permutation su ces to construct a PRF ensemble such that for distinct secret keys k; k 0 the functions determined by k and k 0 map 1 n to di erent values. We call such ensembles xed-value-keybinding as the key is determined by the function value for 1 n or, using a minor modi cation, for any other xed value instead of 1 n . Second, we prove that xed-value-key-binding PRF ensembles yield PRF tribe enembles. After presenting a conceptually simple construction of xed-value-key-binding ensembles based on the GGM-tree design to the authors of CMR98], they pointed out an improvement that led to the more practical solution which does not necessarily involve the GGM-construction. Instead it works with a every PRF ensemble by assimilating the one-way permutation to the given ensemble. This yields a xed-value-key-binding PRF ensemble and, in turn, a PRF tribe ensemble which is almost as e cient as the starting PRF ensemble. Moreover, if the functions of the ordinary ensemble are e ciently invertible with help of the secret key then so are the functions of the tribe ensemble. From a theoretical and practical point of view this gives us the best of both worlds: As for the theory, we obtain a simple proof that the existence of one-way permutations implies the existence of PRF tribe ensembles. For practical purposes, we present a construction where pseudorandomness is slightly harder to prove, but which has nice properties. In both cases, the second step deriving the tribe ensemble from the xed-value-key-binding ensemble is identical. We give an outline of this part. It is a reminiscent of Naor's statistically-binding bit commitment scheme N91]. There, the receiver sends a random 3n-bit string A to the committing party who applies a pseudorandom generator G : f0; 1g n ! f0; 1g 3n to a random value r 2 f0; 1g n and returns G(r) A to commit to 1 resp. G(r) to commit to 0. The receiver cannot distinguish both cases with signi cant advantage because of the pseudorandomness of the generator's output. On the other hand, to open a commitment ambiguously the sender has to nd r; r 0 such that G(r) = G(r 0 ) A.
But # fG(r) G(r 0 ) j r; r 0 g 2 2n , hence A 2 fG(r) G(r 0 ) j r; r 0 g with probability at most 2 ?n (over the choice of A). This means that the commitment cannot be opened ambiguously with probability at least 1 ? 2 ?n . We adopt this idea to de ne our PRF tribe ensemble. Given a xed-value-key-binding PRF ensemble we de ne an appropriate xed-value-key-binding PRF ensemble F stretch with functions f stretch k that stretch the input to a su ciently large output. We then show that there exists a value I k (depending on the secret key k) and a function XOR(t; I k ) of the tribe key t and I k such that from the key-binding property it follows that for di erent keys k; k 0 and random t the value XOR(t; I k ) XOR(t; I k 0) is a uniformly distributed string having the same length as the output of f stretch Since the output length of the functions in F stretch is much bigger than the input length and as XOR(t; I k ) XOR(t; I k 0) is a random string for random t, collision resistance of the tribe ensemble is obtained as in Naor's bit commitment scheme. Additionally, we will show that the pseudorandomness of the tribe ensemble follows from the pseudorandomness of F stretch .
Finally, based on our PRF tribe ensemble, we present a committing privatekey encryption scheme, i.e., such that one cannot later open an encryption ambiguously by pretending to have used a di erent secret key. Secure committing public-key encryption systems can be derived for example from trapdoor permutations using the Goldreich-Levin hardcore predicate. In fact, constructing the opposite, public-key schemes that allow to open encryptions ambiguously, is a very interesting problem, because such schemes yield multiparty protocols secure against adaptive adversaries CFGN96,CG96,CDNO97]. Given an arbitrary xed-value-key-binding PRF ensemble we present a straightforward solution for a committing private-key system. Unfortunately, this scheme allows to deduce if two encryptions have been generated with the same secret key; a drawback which schemes based on PRF ensembles usually do not have. Therefore, we present another committing system that does not have this disadvantage, and prove that this scheme is secure against chosen ciphertext and plaintext attacks or, equivalent, non-malleable.
Our committing private-key scheme has an interesting application in light of the recent announcement of the French government CISI99]. The government plans a liberalisation of encryption and, in particular, it is not planned to enforce key deposit. Instead, there are supposed to be obligations to hand over the cleartext to legal authorities on request. For ordinary 2 public-key schemes, this means that the user simply hands over the message and the randomness and the authority checks the validity by re-encrypting and comparing the result to the ciphertext. As long as the encryption scheme supports errorless decryption, the user cannot claim to have encrypted a di erent message. Unfortunately, this does not work for private-key schemes in general, because the authority cannot re-encrypt without knowing the secret key, and even if it is given some secret key, this might not be the key that has been really used. Hence, the user might be able to open the encryption ambiguously.This is ruled out if we use a committing private-key encryption scheme: If a legal authority compels to open an encryption then the user hands over the message m, the randomness r and the secret key k. The authority is then able to verify that the encryption is opened correctly. But this also reveals the secret key and therefore all messages encrypted with this key. Zero-Knowledge proofs provide a solution that allows the user to maintain secrecy of the key: The user passes m and r to the authority and then proves in zero-knowledge that there exists some key k such that the ciphertext equals the encryption of m under key k with randomness r. Obviously, this is an NPstatement and can therefore be proven in constant-round zero-knowledge (either based on general proof systems or on some speci c system for the underlying encryption scheme). Since there is only a single triple (m; r; k) that maps to the ciphertext in question, the soundness of the zero-knowledge proof guarantees that a dishonest user cannot open the encryption unambiguously except with small error probability. This method keeps k secret at a very high price: The computational e ort is quite immense and it requires interaction between the authority and the user. The proof is, however, only necessary in case of a dispute and the obligations require interaction anyway. Additionally, if the authority obliges many messages encrypted with the same key then we prove the validity of the encryptions in parallel, i.e., prove that there is a key such that the sequence of ciphertexts have been produced from the sequence of messages.
Preliminaries
For sake of self-containment, we brie y recall basic de nitions of pseudorandom functions, pseudorandom generators, etc. See G95] for the underlying intuition. At the end of this section, we repeat the GGM-construction and the de nition of pseudorandom function tribe ensembles. We present all de nitions for uniform adversaries only; replacing the term \polynomial-time algorithm" by \polyno-mial circuit family" one easily obtains the nonuniform counterpart.
A function (n) is called negligible in n if (n) < 1=p(n) for any positive polynomial p(n) and all su ciently large n. A polynomial-time computable function f is one-way if for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A the probability Prob A(1 n ; f(x)) 2 f ?1 (x) that A outputs a preimage of f(x) for random x 2 f0; 1g n is negligible in n. A one-way function f is a one-way permutation . In the sequel we denote by R = fR (n) g n2I N the function ensemble that contains all functions g : f0; 1g
here in(n) and out(n) and therefore the key space of R Pseudorandom function ensembles can be constructed from any pseudorandom generator via the GGM-tree design GGM86]. Let G denote a lengthdoubling pseudorandom generator, i.e., with output length`(n) = 2n; such generators can be constructed from any pseudorandom generators by modifying the output length. Let G 0 (x) resp. G 1 (x) denote the left and right half of G(x) and de ne the function ensemble F with key space K n = f0; 1g n and input/output length in(n) = out(n) = n by f k (
Here, x 1 ; : : : ; x n 2 f0; 1g and x = x 1 ; ; x n is the concatenation of x 1 ; : : : ; x n .
The function f k can be described by a binary tree of depth n where the root is labeled with k and each left (right) child of a node v is labeled with G 0 (label(v)) resp. G 1 (label(v)). A value x 2 f0; 1g n then determines a path from the root to some leaf and the function value f k (x) equals the label of this leaf. Goldreich et al. GGM86] prove that the derived ensemble F is pseudorandom.
A PRF tribe function ensemble with key space K = fK n g n2I N and tribe key space T = fT n g n2I N is a function ensemble F = ffF (n) 3 Constructing PRF Tribe Ensembles
We rst show how to construct an PRF ensemble F bind such that f bind
for keys k 6 = k 0 . Put di erently, the function value at 1 n commits to the key. We therefore say that this ensemble binds the key (for a xed value) because once we have seen the value at 1 n one cannot later pretend to have used another key. Obviously, we can also take any other xed value x 0 instead of 1 n by setting f k (x) = f bind k (x x 0 1 n ). We then use such a xed-value-keybinding PRF ensemble to derive a pseudorandom function (with tribe key t) where f Another construction of xed-value-key-binding ensembles was proposed by the authors of CMR98] after presenting the GGM-based approach to them. The advantage is that we use the underlying pseudorandom function as a black box and merely add the length-doubling generator G (with G 1 being one-to-one) on. Particularly, instead of using the GGM-construction one can start with any PRF ensemble. For instance, more e cient constructions of PRF ensembles based on synthesizers NR95] resp. on the Decisional-Di e-Hellman assumption NR97] su ce. In practice, one can also use appropriate candidates like the forthcoming AES.
So let F start be an arbitrary PRF ensemble (the starting point). For simplicity, we suppose that each function f start k of F start;(n) maps n bits to n bits and that the key length equals n, too. We discuss below how to patch other cases. Set k has this property. We remark that every PRF ensemble can be turned into a PRP ensemble LR88]; see NR99] for recent results. Yet, using the Luby-Racko transformation, the key length of the derived permutation grows. This can be handled by stretching the output length of the generator G accordingly; it su ces that G is one-to-one on the bits that replace the output at 1 n . In particular, if the output length of f start k 0 is smaller than right half of G(k) then we can rst stretch the output of f start k 0 at the cost of decreasing the input length slightly. We will use this technique in the next section, too, so we omit further details here. The proof that the ensemble F bind de ned by equation (1) We remark that once the key is generated (by evaluating the pseudorandom generator) computing f bind k (x) is as fast as computing f start k (x). Particularly, f start k may be any fast practical pseudorandom function candidate. In contrast, using the GGM-based approach we have to apply n times a pseudorandom generator which is one-to-one on the right half, e.g., based on a number-theoretic one-way permutation like RSA.
PRF Tribe Ensembles from Key-Binding PRF Ensembles
Let F bind be a xed-value-key-binding PRF ensemble (for the value 1 n ). In another intermediary step we de ne a PRF ensemble F stretch that has input length n?3, but stretches the output length to 5n. De ne the functions f stretch . The rightmost n bits of f(x) are random bits and the rightmost n bits of XOR(t; I) equal 0 n . Hence, with probability 2 ?n we have equality on these bits. The leftmost 4n bits of f(x) are random bits that are independent of the other n bits. Therefore, the probability that these bits equal the leftmost 4n bits of y XOR(t; I) is 2 ?4n and both probabilities multiply due to the independence. Clearly, we can lower the error probability of the collision resistance. For example, to achieve an error of 2 ?4n we extend f stretch k to 8n bits output and choose the t i 's at random from f0; 1g 7n f0 n g. If, in addition to an extended output length of at least 6n bits, we use a pseudorandom permutation F start then we derive a pseudorandom function tribe ensemble F such that f (x) invert the rightmost n bits of y under the starting pseudorandom function to obtain x111 and therefore x (note that the rightmost n bits of XOR(t; I k ) equal 0 n ). We call such an ensembles key-binding-and-invertible. Observe that the key-and-preimage-binding property alone can be achieved by taking output length 8n bits, choosing 2n ? 3 strings t i from f0; 1g Using a xed-value-key-binding PRF ensemble the obvious solution Enc k (m; r) = (f k (1 n ); r; f k (r) m) works. This correpsonds to the case that one appends the same commitment of the key to each encryption. The drawback of this solution is that an eavesdropper knows whenever the parties change the secret key. In some settings hiding this fact might be crucial. For instance, if one party sends the new secret key by encrypting it with the current one, then breaking this encryption by an exhaustive search makes all the following messages visible to the adversary. We can overcome this disadvantage by computing a new commitment for each encryption, say, by applying the key-binding-and-invertible PRF tribe ensemble of Section 3. But before presenting our committing and key-hiding scheme we formalize the notion of a key-hiding scheme. Let (KGen; Enc; Dec) be a privatekey encryption scheme and D be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm. We consider two experiments. In the rst experiment, we independently execute KGen Actually, every secure 3 scheme should \hide" the key, i.e., it should not reveal the key. Otherwise it can be easily broken. However, De nition 2 demands even more. For instance, an encryption scheme where each encryption leaks the Hamming weight of the key with some probability that is not negligible does not hide the key as de ned above. Yet, the scheme may be secure.
We remark that we do not grant D access to the decryption oracles Dec k and Dec k 0, respectively. Otherwise D could distinguish both cases easily: D encrypts some message m with the rst oracle, sends switch and tries to decrypt with the second decryption oracle; this only yields m again if the keys have not changed.
Next we de ne our committing and key-hiding private-key encryption scheme (KGen com , Enc com , Dec com ). Let F be a PRF tribe ensemble derived by the technique of Section 3.2 from a key-binding-and-invertible ensemble F bind . We assume that some trusted party chooses a random tribe key t and publishes it or sends it to the participating parties, respectively. Hence, we do not achieve the committing property of De nition 1 perfectly, but only with exponentially small error probability. Abusing notations we will also call this derived scheme committing. Algorithm KGen com ( u t It is quite easy to see that this scheme is polynomially secure as de ned in GM84]. We sketch this and other security notions in Appendix B. In fact, it is not hard to show either that it is even secure against lunchtime attacks NY90] if we use a strong PRP:
Proposition 5. If F bind is a strong PRP ensemble, then the encryption scheme (KGen com ; Enc com ; Dec com ) is a committing and key-hiding private-key encryption which is secure against lunchtime attacks.
Proof. (Idea) Otherwise we derive a contradiction to the pseudorandomness of F bind (which also contradicts the pseudorandomness of the tribe ensemble F). A distinguisher D that is given oracle access to a function f and its inverse function f ?1 can simulate the lunchtime attacker by choosing the r's at random and computing the encryption via the oracle f, and decrypt by using f ?1 . If there exist a successful lunchtime attacker then we obtain an algorithm that distinguishes at least one hybrid pair of the following distributions successfully:
1. answering all encryption and decryption queries with f; f ?1 , where f randomly chosen from F bind , and encrypting the challenge message m 0 2. answering the queries with a truly random function pair f; f ?1 from the set R of all permutations and encrypting m 0 3. answering all queries with a random function pair f; f ?1 from R and encrypting m 1 4. answering all queries with a random function pair f; f ?1 from F and encrypting m 1
If the rst and second distribution or the third and fourth distribution can be distinguished signi cantly then we derive a contradiction to the pseudorandomness of F bind . Assume that one can distinguish the second and third distribution successfully. Observe that the challenge (y; c) for m 0 resp. m 1 leaves two possibilities r 0 ; r 1 for r: either r 0 = m 0 c or r 1 = m 1 c. If both values have not appeared among the previous queries (which happens with probability at least 1 ? 2 poly(n) 2 ?n+3 ) then y (basically) is a random value and reveals no information about r and therefore the encrypted message. Hence, there is no possibility to distinguish encryptions of m 0 and m 1 with probability at least 1= poly(n) and this case cannot occur. Proof. (Idea) Letting the adversary encrypt messages of its choice after receiving the challenge does not endanger our scheme. It su ces to show that the decryption oracle does not help signi cantly. The simulator D of the ciphertext attacker returns Error whenever the attacker puts a decryption query (y; c) for some value y that has not been appeared previously as part of an encryption output, or if c does not equal r m for the values r; m which have been used when computing y previously. Else it answers with the known value m. This simulation fails with negligible probability only, since otherwise we could construct an algorithm that successfully distinguishes the output of a pseudorandom function for a \new" input value and a truly random string. But this would contradict the pseudorandomness of the ensemble GGM86]. Let us consider this in more detail. Assume that with probability 1= poly(n) the attacker puts a query (y; c) such that y has not been output by the encryption oracle so far, and such that c is correct. We simply try to guess this query (among the at most polynomial many queries) and then pass y as a challenge and receive either f ?1 (y) for the oracle pair f; f ?1 chosen at random from F bind , or a random string z. We are supposed to tell both cases apart. By assumption, c equals the xor of the left and right half of f ?1 (y) with probability 1= poly(n). But the probability that it equals the corresponding xor of a random string z is negligible. Therefore, we can distinguish both cases with probability 1= poly(n), which contradicts the pseudorandomness of f ?1 . Now, given that this simulation succeeds, we obtain the desired result by applying the same argument of the proof of Proposition 5. BDPR98] showed that (semantic) security against chosen ciphertext and plaintext attacks implies nonmalleability. Hence, our scheme is non-malleable as well. In fact, our construction gives an alternative to the non-malleable private-key scheme presented in DDN99]. The construction there is similar, but needs two pseudorandom function evaluations with two independent secret keys. Nevertheless, the construction there does not require the pseudorandom functions to be strong pseudorandom permutations. 
